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ABSTRACT
What determines support among individuals for redistributive policies? Do individuals care about others when they assess the consequences of redistribution? Using data
for the US from 1978 to 2010, we fnd that differences in redistribution preferences
between the rich and the poor are high in some states and low in others. This difference has a lot to do with the rich and very little to do with the poor. While support
for redistribution decreases with income, the preferences of the rich are very sensitive
to the level of macro-inequality, and the rich are more supportive of redistribution in
unequal states than they are in more equal states. To explain this relationship, we
propose a model of other-regarding preferences for redistribution, which we term
“income-dependent altruism.” In making these distinctions between the poor and the
rich, the arguments in this paper challenge some infuential approaches to the politics
of inequality.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What determines support for government tax-and-transfer policies that redistribute
income and reduce inequality? In the standard approaches to addressing this question,
political economy models portray individuals as self-interested: they care only about
how redistribution affects thier material welfare. Yet widespread dissatisfaction
exists with this self-interested approach to preferences. Surely, the argument goes,
individuals do not always make choices based only on such narrow concerns.
If we were to look at the preferences of rich and poor in different states in the US,
as we do below, we would observe levels of support for redistribution among the rich
that cannot be explained by material self-interest alone. Moreover, we would also
observe very signifcant differences in how apart the rich are from the poor regarding
their favored levels of redistribution. These important differences in support for
redistribution have received little attention in the existing scholarship and yet they
should be a most signifcant element in our explanation of outcomes as diverse (and
as important) as the generosity of the welfare state, political polarization, varieties of
capitalism, etc.
In this paper, we present a novel theory of redistribution preferences, termed
“income-dependent altruism.” In our model, individuals weigh the welfare of others
as well as their own. Using American survey data, we present a set of empirical tests
that support our hypotheses (and provide limited evidence in favor of alternative
explanations). We fnd that after accounting for material self-interest, there is still
a great degree of variation in redistribution preferences. Interestingly, we show
that this variation has more to do with the preferences of the rich than those of the
poor, and that it can be explained by taking into account the relationship between
macro-inequality and altruism.
The argument explaining this variation can be summarized very simply. Because
individuals care about their own welfare, the (relatively) poor support redistribution
more than the (relatively) rich, as in the familiar self-interest approach. We could call
this the relative income effect. However, because individuals are also other-regarding,
there are two additional implications of our theory concerning what we could call
the macro-inequality effect. Each of these implications depends on the simple notion
that people have a diminishing marginal utility for consumption, that is, that a richer
person values an additional dollar of consumption less than a poorer person. The
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frst implication is that an increase in macro-inequality will lead to more support for
redistribution from all individuals. While an increase in inequality reduces social
welfare (because the rich value an additional dollar less than the poor), an increase
in redistribution increases social welfare (for the same reason). Therefore, because
individuals are altruistic—meaning that they are concerned about social welfare—they
will support more redistribution in response to increasing inequality. The second
and less obvious implication is that an increase in macro-inequality will lead to a
larger increase in support for redistribution from the rich than from the poor. In this
case, because the rich value an additional dollar less than the poor, an increase in
redistribution aimed at reducing inequality is less costly (in welfare terms) to a richer
person than to a poorer person (hence, our income-dependent altruism).
Theoretically, the contribution in this paper is to derive implications for preferences
for redistribution from a social-welfare model of altruism (which, as far as we are
aware, has not been done before). These implications are quite distinct and therefore
challenge some infuential approaches to the politics of inequality. These include other
versions of the nature of other-regarding preferences (like the “inequity aversion”
preferences proposed by Fehr and Schmidt 1999 or the “fairness” preferences analyzed
by Alesina and Angeletos 2005) and those emphasizing insurance concerns (see, for
example, Alt and Iversen 2013). We will elaborate on our differences from these
approaches in the pages that follow, but we should clarify frst how we approach the
topic of other-regarding preferences.
The possibility that other-regarding concerns infuence redistribution preferences
has received increasing amounts of attention in the recent political economy literature.
There is neural evidence that individuals have a dislike for unequal distributions,
independent from social image or potential reciprocity motivations. Tricomi et al.
(2010) use functional magnetic resonance imaging to test directly for the presence of
inequality-averse social preferences in the human brain. In laboratory experiments,
individuals have been shown to have concerns for the welfare of others (see, for
example, Charness and Rabin 2002, and Fehr and Gächter 2000). A number of
alternative models have been presented to analyze different kinds of other-regarding
concerns (for reviews, see Fehr and Schmidt 2006 and DellaVigna 2009). As we have
mentioned (and will document below), support for redistribution is widespread in
the US and extends into income groups whose support for redistribution could not be
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motivated by short-term income maximization. Altruism constitutes one plausible
reason why affuent individuals might support redistribution even though its effect is
to reduce their disposable income and their share of total income. But “altruism is not
an unpredictable ‘social noise’ to be randomly sprinkled over individuals” (Alesina
and Giuliano 2011: 94). Altruistic concerns need to be systematized into predictable
hypotheses. We follow Alesina and Giuliano (2011: 94) in arguing that “standard
neoclassical general equilibrium theory can accommodate altruism, i.e., a situation in
which one agent cares also about the utility of somebody else.”
In this paper, we defne altruism as concern about the welfare of others (e.g.,
Charness and Rabin 2002). This conception of altruism should be distinguished from
those that construe altruism as a “taste for giving” (Andreoni 1989, 1990) or as a direct
aversion to differences in material payoffs, as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). There is
also a signifcant literature on altruism as a personality trait.4 In this research altruism
has often taken the form of a self-reported measure (the Self-Report Altruism, SRA,
Scale) aggregating different items capturing an individual’s engagement in altruistic
behaviors (pushing a stranger’s car out of the snow, giving money to a charity, etc).
In general then, one can contrast two approaches: The frst analyzes altruism
as an individual characteristic (personality trait, taste for giving) while the second
understands other-regarding concerns to be affected by a “situational” logic (social
welfare, inequity aversion). In this second category, other-regarding preferences
are inevitably linked to macro levels of inequality. When altruism is signifcant, as
the allocation of material payoffs become more equitable, the utility of individuals
increases (see, for example, Fehr and Gächter 2000).
While we accept that the role of altruism as an individual characteristic in determining redistribution preferences is an important one, we emphasize a situational
approach in this paper. We will show that it is very useful to argue that individual
preferences for redistribution are affected by social welfare. We agree that, for many
economic outcomes, personality measures are as predictive as cognitive ones (see, for
example, Almlund et al. 2011) but fnd this compatible with our main argument. It is
certainly possible that there are some individuals that have more altruistic personalities than others. But, as we will show in the next section, this would not affect the
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See, for example, the research on altruistic personality by Rushton et al. (1981).
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general implications of our argument about the relationship between redistribution
preferences and macro levels of inequality.
It is important to fnally emphasize in this introduction that this paper focuses on
the demand for redistribution, and brackets away how (or even if) this demand is
translated into policy. Inequality and redistribution in America have received, and for
good reason, a resurgence in academic interest in recents times. Bartels (2009) has
shown the spectacular increase in inequality over the past 35 years to be the product
of policy choices in a political system dominated by partisanship and particularly
receptive to the preferences of the wealthy. Hacker and Pierson (2011) coincide
not only in the appreciation of the attention that policy-makers pay to the rich (and
not the poor) in America, but also about the fact that politics is the main factor
behind inequality (“American politics did it”). But we still know too little about the
determinants of redistributive preferences.5 In fact, we agree with McCarty et al.
when they argue that:
“Although much recent work in comparative political economy has sought
to link inequality to political confict and back to economic policy, few of
these insights have been applied to American politics.” (McCarty et al.
2008: 73).
If inequality matters to individual political behavior, however, it seems reasonable to
assume that it does so through its infuence on redistribution preferences. Analyzing
the demand for redistribution is therefore an essential frst step for an accurate
understanding of the supply of redistribution and it is this task that this paper now
turns to.

II. A MODEL OF ALTRUISTIC PREFERENCES FOR REDISTRIBUTION
This section introduces our proposed model for understanding the relationship
between self-interest, other-regarding concerns, and preferences for redistribution,
which we call income-dependent altruism. We then demonstrate the distinctiveness of
our results by contrasting our model with several prominent alternatives.

5

Paradoxically, this is a topic that has been the focus of more research in the economics (see, for
example, Alesina and La Ferrara 2005, Fong 2001, and Keely and Tan 2008) than in the political
science literature.
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Income, Redistribution, and Budgets
Let there be a set of n individuals, indexed by i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Individuals
are distinguished by their gross income level, y. Thus, the gross income of the ith
individual is given by yi , where 0 ≤ yi < y j ≤ ∞ for i < j. Average income is then
defned as

n

1X
ȳ =
yi
n i=1

(1)

The government operates a linear tax, τ, τ ∈ [0, 1], and distributes the proceeds
to all citizens in equal lump-sum transfers, T . The size of the transfer is determined
by government revenue, τ ȳ, less the costs of taxation φ(τ) ȳ. To keep the model as
simple as possible, we assume that φ(τ) = 12 τ2 . The government’s budget is balanced,
so



1 2
T = τ − τ ȳ.
2

(2)

With taxes and transfers, each agent’s budget constraint, equivalent to her consumption or disposable income, is then given by:
ci = (1 − τ) yi + T

(3)

Preferences
Individuals have a separable utility function consisting of both their own utility (or
self-interested utility), u(ci ), which is defned over each person’s disposable income
ci , and other-regarding utility, Ω, parameterized by δ:
V [u(ci ), Ω] = (1 − δ)u(ci ) + δΩ

(4)

In this set-up, δ ∈ (0, 1) determines how much weight an individual places on
individual versus social welfare: a larger δ means the person cares more about social
welfare and less about individual welfare. It would be perfectly plausible to allow the
parameter δ to vary across different individual types—altruistic versus non-altruistic—
in which case we would write δi . However, not allowing δ to vary makes clear that our
results, in particular the relationship between income and inequality, do not depend
on such variation.
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For the agent’s own utility, we impose the following standard restrictions on u:
u0 (c) > 0,
u00 (c) < 0, and

(5)

lim u0 (c) = ∞,
c→0

In addition, in certain cases it will be either convenient or necessary to adopt a specifc
form for these assumptions:
u(c) =

c 1−ε
, for ε ∈ (0, 1)
1−ε

(6)

One implication of this specifcation is that u exhibits the Arrow-Pratt measure of
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA; Pratt 1964): R(c) = −cu00 (c)/u0 (c) = ε. Note
our assumption on ε, which will imply, following Iversen and Soskice (2001) and
Moene and Wallerstein (2001), that the amount of redistribution preferred by an
individual will decrease as her income increases.
As for other-regarding preferences, we assume that they take the form of a standard
social welfare function:

n

1X
Ω=
u(c j )
n j=1

(7)

which is simply the average of all individuals’ utility. We explicate and explore the
implications of these assumptions in the following section.

III. MODEL RESULTS
A. Implications of the Model
A critical implication of the social welfare function is that it directly refects levels
of income inequality, which is made explicit by the following lemma. The basis
behind this identity is straightforward. It was demonstrated in a classic paper by
Atkinson (1970), which constructs an index of inequality from a standard social
welfare function. Assuming the specifcation for constant relative risk aversion in
equation (6), we denote this Atkinson Index as Q ∈ [0, 1], with 0 implying perfect
income equality (everyone has equal income) and 1 perfect inequality (one person
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owns all income). The index is given by:
1
Q(τ; c1 , c2 , . . . , cn ) = 1 −
c̄



n

1 X 1−ε
c
n i=1 i

1/(1−ε)
, for ε ∈ (0, 1)

(8)

where c̄ denotes average disposable income. The identity between the social welfare
function and inequality is stated formally in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. (Social welfare and inequality.) The social welfare function can be expressed in terms of both mean income, c̄, and inequality, Q, as defned by the Atkinson
Index:
Ω = u [c̄(1 − Q)] = u(ce )

(9)

where c̄(1 − Q) is the abbreviated social welfare function and ce is described as equally
distributed equivalent income.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Hence, the expression c̄(1 − Q) captures the idea that as inequality increases social
welfare decreases. Slightly more formally, a larger Q (higher inequality) implies a
smaller c̄(1 − Q), which is equivalent to a reduction in Ω (lower social welfare). As
stated, the fact that the social welfare function can be expressed directly in terms of
inequality shows that the social welfare function is also a measure of inequality. The
lemma has two additional implications. First, it dictates the choice of the measure of
inequality we use in our empirical analysis, which is the Atkinson Index. In addition,
the identity with the utility of equally distributed equivalent income serves a more
technical purpose, which is explained in the proof to the lemma.
Most importantly for our argument, the relationship between the social welfare
function and income inequality means that, although social welfare is simply an
aggregate of all individuals’ utility, the social welfare function also affects inequality
aversion. This is because utility functions are concave—that is, individuals have
diminishing marginal utility of consumption. Consequently, because the rich value an
additional dollar of consumption less than the poor, transferring a dollar from the
poor to the rich—that is, increasing the level of inequality—reduces social welfare.
By the same token, transferring a dollar from the rich to the poor increases social
welfare.
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Before proceeding, we pause to acknowledge that whose social welfare or which
inequality is considered by an individual is an open theoretical question. We can
think of compelling reasons for why individuals would be concerned about national
level inequality (if redistribution occurs primarily through national institutions),
regional/state and local levels of inequality (if salience, proximity, or availability of
information matters to altruism), or all of them together. To anticipate our empirical
analysis, we attempt to fully exploit the available data by construing the social-welfare
function as being composed of state-level incomes and utility functions, even though
self-interested preferences (as well as the administration of tax and transfer programs)
are oriented toward the national level. This decision changes none of the theoretical
insights we describe below.
Turning to the implications of our conception of altruism for individual preferences
for redistribution, we advance four distinct claims. Our frst and most straightforward
claim is that the level of redistribution preferred by an individual is decreasing in her
income, which would also be the case if individuals were purely self-interested . This
is because although individuals have mixed motives (they care about inequality and
social welfare), they still care about the impact that redistributive policies have on
their own welfare. Accordingly, richer individuals support less redistribution than
poorer individuals.
Second, there is some income threshold above which an individual prefers no redistribution and below which an individual prefers some positive amount of redistribution.
This threshold also exists in the standard, self-interested model of redistributive preferences. However, the critical difference in our model is that this threshold is strictly
above the income threshold that would obtain with purely self-interested individuals.
This result follows directly from our altruistic model of preferences. Because individuals care about the welfare of others, relatively affuent individuals are willing to
support more redistribution than they would if they were merely self-interested.
Third, an increase in inequality will increase an individual’s demand for redistribution. This result follows from the effect of an increase in inequality on social welfare
and individuals’ other-regarding preferences. Because inequality decreases social
welfare, it also lowers individuals’ utility, via their other-regarding concerns. Thus,
by increasing redistribution, individuals can reduce inequality and increase social
welfare.

9

The fnal claim that we make is the most important statement we derive from our
model of altruistic preferences for redistribution. Even though the rich prefer less
redistribution than the poor, we claim that an increase in inequality will lead to a
larger increase in support for redistribution from the rich than from the poor. Although
perhaps counterintuitive at frst, this claim can be simply understood within our basic
conception of altruistic preferences. As we have seen, the assumption of a concave
utility function plays a crucial role in shaping inequality aversion with respect to the
other-regarding portion of an individual’s preferences. But it also plays an important
role in individuals’ own self-interested preferences for consumption over redistribution.
A rich person prefers less redistribution than a poor person for self-interested reasons,
but an increase in inequality increases her demand for redistribution more than a
poor person. This is because she values an additional dollar of consumption less
than a poor person does. She would therefore rather spend more of that dollar on
redistribution than on personal consumption. In contrast, when inequality increases,
a poor person, who already favors more redistribution for self-interested reasons,
values an additional dollar of consumption more and would rather spend more of that
dollar on personal consumption than on alleviating inequality. Thus, at the margin, a
richer individual is willing to trade more consumption for redistribution even though
overall she prefers less redistribution than a poor person.
We also demonstrate that this fnal result obtains only if there is diminishing
marginal utility of consumption. Thus, one might argue that increases in inequality
do not change the preferences of the poor very much because they already favor a
higher amount of redistribution. And indeed such an effect can be identifed in the
model. However, this effect is not suffcient by itself to explain the positive interaction
between income and an increase in inequality. If utility functions are not concave,
this interaction effect is zero.
These results can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. (Income-dependent altruism.) The model of altruistic preferences
given by equation (4) has the following properties:
(A) For yi ≥ ŷ, the level of redistribution preferred by individual i, denoted τ∗i , is τ∗i = 0.
For yi < ŷ, the preferred level of redistribution satisfes 0 < τ∗i < 1. Furthermore,
we note that ŷ > ȳ: the income threshold for preferring some positive amount of
redistribution is greater than mean income.
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τ∗i
1

Q0
Q

0

yi

ȳ

Figure 1: Income-dependent altruism: The effect of an increase in inequality (from Q
to Q0 ) on redistribution preferences
(B) An individual i’s preferred level of redistribution τ∗i is decreasing in individual
income yi . Formally,

∂ τ∗i
∂ yi

< 0 for all yi ∈ [0, ŷ].

(C) An individual i’s preferred level of redistribution τ∗i is increasing in inequality Q.
Formally,

∂ τ∗i
∂Q

> 0 for all ye ∈ [0, ȳ].

(D) The effect of an increase of inequality Q on an individual i’s preferred level of
redistribution τ∗i is increasing in individual income yi . Formally,

∂ 2 τ∗i
∂ Q∂ yi

≥ 0 for all

yi ∈ [0, ŷ]. Furthermore, this is true if and only if the utility function is strictly
concave. That is, for all ε ∈ [0, 1),
∂ 2 τ∗i
∂ Q∂ yi

∂ 2 τ∗i
∂ Q∂ yi

≥ 0 if and only if ε > 0; otherwise,

= 0.

Proof. See Appendix A.
Figure 1 graphically depicts the impact of an increase in inequality on redistributive preferences.6 With income displayed on the horizontal line and redistributive
preferences on the vertical line, the two curves represent the relationship between
an individual’s income and her redistribution preferences at two different levels of
inequality. The lower line represents a lower level of inequality (Q), while the upper
curve corresponds with a higher level of inequality (Q0 ). Thus increases in inequality

6

To plot these utility functions we set ε and δ to 0.5.
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shift the income-redistribution curve upwards. As explained in the previous paragraphs, this implies that an increase in inequality increases demand for redistribution
from all individuals, regardless of income. However, as theorized above, note that the
distance between the two curves increases as one moves up the income scale. Thus,
an increase in inequality has a smaller effect on the redistributive preferences of the
poor and a larger effect for the rich.
B. Distinguishing the Model
We are of course not the frst to suggest that other-regarding concerns play a role in
support for redistribution. In this section, we distinguish the implications of our model
from alternative approaches. Because our argument highlights the other-regarding
consequences of economic inequality, we focus on those models with similar features.7
The most infuential ones in the political economy literature are Fehr and Schmidt’s
(1999) on “reference-dependent inequity aversion” and Alesina and Angeletos’s (2005)
on “fairness” preferences. The inequity-aversion preferences of Fehr and Schmidt have
been widely cited and applied8 and are based on extensive experimental evidence. By
distinguishing between “fair” and “unfair” inequalities, the argument by Alesina and
Angeletos accords with the popular notion that only inequality in opportunities, rather
than outcomes, deserves to be corrected. Furthermore, it has been generally received
as a compelling resolution of the puzzling macro-comparative fnding (the so-called
“Robin Hood” paradox) that redistribution is higher when inequality is lower—i.e.,
where there appears to be less need for redistribution.
In Fehr and Schmidt’s conception, inequality comes at a cost to individuals’ otherregarding utility. But how an individual evaluates inequality depends on how her
income relates to those of others. Differences in income between an individual
and those with income greater than hers is termed “disadvantageous inequality”
or envy. Differences in income between an individual and those with income less
than hers is called “advantageous inequality” or altruism. The critical restriction
that Fehr and Schmidt place on their version of other-regarding preferences is that

7

Thus, we do not directly address “social distance” models (e.g., Lupu and Pontusson 2011; Shayo
2009), which highlight the limits of other-regardingness, or models such as “last-place aversion”
preferences (Kuziemko et al. 2014), which make predictions about the effects of inequality on only
a smaller subset of the population.
8
For a recent application in political science, see, e.g., Lü and Scheve (2014).
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concern about advantageous inequality is assumed to matter less than concern about
disadvantageous inequality. Alternatively, one could say that individuals are assumed
to be more envious than they are altruistic.
This assumption has important implications for redistributive preferences. Similar
to altruistic preferences, the inclusion of other-regarding utility raises the income
threshold of the person who favors the least, but some positive, amount of redistribution. Whether advantaged or disadvantaged by inequality, any amount of inequality
comes at a cost to individuals’ other-regarding utility. Thus, the existence of any
amount of inequality increases an individual’s demand for redistribution relative
to her purely self-interested preferences. However, for Fehr and Schmidt, poorer
individuals have a stronger reaction to changes in inequality than richer individuals
(which is the opposite of the implication from our model). On the one hand, an
increase in inequality comes at an other-regarding cost to all individuals. On the
other, for those poor individuals lower down on the income scale, this change is more
likely to increase their disadvantageous inequality, while for those rich individuals
higher on the income scale, this will increase their advantageous inequality. Since
envy is weighted more than altruism in Fehr and Schmidt’s model, a rise in inequality
will have a larger impact on the poor than on the rich and will increase the demand
for redistribution more from the poor than from the rich.
The arguments in Alesina and Angeletos (2005) are based on the idea that individuals have both “earned” or “fair” income as well as “unearned” or “unfair” income, and
that only “unfair” income comes at a utility cost to individuals. Thus, inequality of
fnal outcomes is of little concern to individuals, and they may tolerate a high degree
of it, provided that it is “fair.” The frst implication is that, provided there is at least
some unearned inequality, the income level of the person who wants at least some
amount of redistribution increases relative to the self-interested threshold, just as
with altruism and inequity aversion.
However, different from both altruism and inequity aversion, under fairness preferences an increase in inequality lowers all individuals’ demand for redistribution. This
is because it is not always clear how much of an individual’s income is a result of
effort rather than luck. When inequality is high,differences in income are assumed to
be driven primarily by differences in returns to talent, ability and effort. Conversely,
when inequality is low, it is assumed to be the product of arbitrary luck, rather than
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(A) Self-interest

τ∗i

τ∗i

1

(B) Fehr Schmidt

1

Q0
Q

Q = Q0

0

ȳ
(C) Alesina Angeletos

τ∗i

0

yi

ȳ
τ∗i

1

yi

(D) Income Dep. Altruism

1
Q0
Q

Q

Q0

0

ȳ

0

yi

¯y

yi

Figure 2: Implication of changes in inequality for redistribution preferences in four
alternative models. Low (Q) and high (Q0 ) inequality. Mean income is denoted by ȳ.

effort. Since individuals with fairness concerns want to correct for luck income rather
than earned income, they will favor more redistribution when inequality is low than
when it is high. Thus, an increase in inequality will lower an individual’s preferred
level of redistribution (the opposite implication from the one proposed in this paper).
Figure 2 illustrates four different models of preferences – pure self-interest (A),
inequity aversion (B), fairness (C), and income-dependent altruism (D) – and the
distinct patterns of income, inequality, and preferences for redistribution they imply.
Getting similarities out of the way frst, we can observe that in all other-regarding
models (B to D) the level of redistribution preferred by an individual is decreasing in
her income, just like in the classic Meltzer-Richard model. This refects the fact that
individuals have mixed motives: although agents may be other-regarding, they care
for their own interests as well. Note also that in all of the other-regarding models,
concern about inequality increases the income domain over which individuals prefer
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at least some positive amount of redistribution. When individuals are purely self
interested, no one above the mean income prefers any level of redistribution. When
individuals have other-regarding concerns, at least some with income above the mean
prefer some redistribution. This is the result of other-regardingness in action: concern
about others’ welfare leads individuals to favor more redistribution than if they were
purely self interested.9
Turning now to differences, the frst observation to make is the way that a meanpreserving increase in inequality changes preferences for redistribution. Such a
change has an effect in all of the other-regarding models, but not the self-interested
one. A mean-preserving change in inequality makes no difference to self-interested
persons with the same income under either distribution. For both inequity aversion (B)
and income-dependent altruism (D), an increase in inequality increases the demand
for redistribution for individuals of all income types. This is because both kinds
of preferences exhibit inequality aversion: inequality in any form comes at a cost
to other-regarding utility. In contrast, an increase in inequality lowers the demand
for redistribution with fairness preferences (C). This is because fairness preferences
are concerned only with unearned or unfair inequality, in contrast to earned or fair
inequality. With fairness preferences, when inequality is high (low), differences in
income are assumed to be less (more) likely the product of luck, and therefore there
is less (more) of a desire to reduce actual inequality.
The second major observation is how an increase in inequality affects individuals
at different points in the income scale. For inequity-aversion preferences, an increase
in inequality increases the demand for redistribution, but this effect decreases as
income increases. This is, as we have explained above, because individuals care more
about what Fehr and Schmidt call disadvantageous inequality (or, envy) than about
advantageous inequality (or, altruism).
In summary, the predictions of income-dependent altruism are quite different from
those of inequity-aversion or fairness models. Unlike fairness preferences, but like
inequity aversion, an increase in inequality increases the demand for redistribution.

9

Note that in all cases mean income, ȳ, is not substantively important. Depending on parameters,
this reference point could take on several possible values. The important observation to make
is the difference that other-regarding concerns make to the threshold condition, ŷ, relative to
self-interested preferences.
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And unlike both fairness and inequity-aversion preferences, the effect of an increase
in inequality is larger for the rich than the poor.10
Before turning to the empirical tests of our hypotheses, it is necessary to contrast
our model with another important approach to social-policy preferences, namely
the “insurance model” (e.g. Iversen and Soskice 2001). Although not a model with
other-regarding preferences, both the insurance model and the one presented in
this paper have similar foundations. Indeed, it is a well-known economic result
that the strict concavity of a utility function implies both risk aversion as well as
inequality aversion (Mas-Colell et al. 1995: 826). Moreover, in a recent paper, Alt
and Iversen (2013) argue that a model of altruism incorporating “social distance”
and an insurance model with segmented labor markets yield substantively identical
conclusions. Nevertheless, our model of income-dependent altruism retains some
implications that are distinct from the social insurance model. This is mainly because
in our altruism model inequality directly affects individuals’ utility but also because it
does not feature a social distance parameter. Consequently, while the thrust of the
model analyzed by Alt and Iversen is that increases in inequality will reduce demand
for redistributive social insurance, our argument is precisely the opposite, namely,
that a rise in inequality will lead individuals to favor more redistribution.

IV. TESTING THE MODEL
Our statistical specifcation closely follows our theoretical model. From the frst
order condition of individual i’s utility function in (4) we derive the theoretical
function τ∗i ( yi , Q), which represents i’s preferred level of redistribution, τ∗i , given i’s
income, yi , and the level of inequality, Q. The (partial) second-order Taylor expansion
of τ∗i ( yi , Q) is given by:11
τ∗i = x +

∂ τ∗i
∂ yi

yi +

∂ τ∗i
∂Q

10

Q+

∂ 2 τ∗i
∂ Q∂ yi

Q yi ,

(10)

The theoretical interactions between income and inequality in the models of Fehr and Schmidt and
Alesina and Angeletos have not, to our knowledge, been derived in the literature. Proofs of these
statements are available from the authors upon request.
11
We simplify by ignoring the higher order quadratic terms (which are relegated to the remainder).
We also estimate the full equation (including higher order terms) using nonlinear least squares and
obtain the same core result. Details are available in Appendix B.
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so that our estimated regression equation is of the form
R i = b yi + cQ + dQ yi .

(11)

Here R i is an individual’s measured level of redistribution preference, and b, c, and d
are estimated parameters representing part (B), (C), and (D) of proposition 1. If our
estimate of b is signifcantly (in the statistical and substantive sense) smaller than
zero, we can infer that

∂ τ∗i
∂ yi

< 0 and confrm part (B) of proposition 1; if our estimate

of c is signifcantly larger than zero, we infer that

∂ τ∗i
∂Q

> 0 confrming part (C). Finally,

in testing our central hypothesis, if our estimate of d is signifcantly larger than zero,
we show that

∂ 2 τ∗i
∂ yi ∂ Q

> 0 and confrm part (D) of proposition 1.
A. Data

We estimate our model using a panel of repeated individual level surveys. The
General Social Survey (GSS) covers more than thirty years and contains measures for
individual income and preferences. It therefore has fgured prominently in studies of
redistribution preferences (e.g., Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Alesina and Giuliano
2011). Our theoretical argument proposes that the importance of inequality emerges
from its relationship to altruism. This implies that the relevant level of macro inequality
should be one at which a visible connection to the need of the poor (and the moral
benefts of generosity) could be made by individuals. We therefore move away from
national data and use state levels of inequality matched to the GSS. We select surveys
starting with 1978 (where redistribution preference measures become available) and
ending in 2010. We limit our population to working-age (20-65) individuals who
are not currently in full-time education. These restrictions yield 21,704 observations.
After removing individuals with missing values on covariates, we are left with 19,025
individuals.12
B. Statistical specifcation
Let R ist be the stated redistribution support of individual i (i = 1, . . . , Nst ) in state
s (s = 1, . . . , S) at time t (t = 1, . . . , T ). Observed survey responses are distinct

12

Multiple imputation does not yield substantively different results. Results available from the authors.
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from preferences. We thus use a latent variable setup, where observed responses are
generated by an underlying continuous latent preference variable R∗ist (e.g., Greene
2002: 669). Since we are interested in the effect of changes in inequality, we opt for
a specifcation which includes state-specifc constants, ξs , as well as common time
shocks, λ t . Due to the nature of our repeated cross-section survey data, some states
have fewer observations per time-point than others. To overcome this limitation, we
specify a hierarchical model for state-specifc effects, yielding shrinkage estimates for
preferences (Jiang 2007; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). This leads us to estimate
the following hierarchical probit specifcation:
R ist = 1(R∗ist > 0)

(12)

R∗ist = β 0 x ist + γ1 yist + γ2Q st + γ3Q st yist + λ t + ξs + εist

(13)

The effect of our variables of interest is captured by the three γ coeffcients, which
capture the role of income distance, yist , the direct effect of inequality in state s in year
t, Q st , and the effect of inequality conditional on income, Q st yist .13 We include an
intercept and a number of individual and state-level controls in x ist , with associated
effect estimates β. Residuals ε are distributed normal with unit variance.14
As discussed above, our state-specifc effects follow a hierarchical specifcation, i.e.,
we specify them as draws from a normal distribution centered at zero with variance
ψ2 estimated from the data,
ξs ∼ N (0, ψ2 ), s = 1, . . . , S.

(14)

We estimate this model using restricted maximum likelihood and integrate over
the random state effects distribution using adaptive Gaussian quadrature with 15
integration points (Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2005).
We investigate the robustness of our model choice in three ways. We estimate a
specifcation where states are fxed effects, as well as a linear probability specifcation
with state and time fxed effects (with R i instead of R∗i as the dependent variable).

13
14

Thus, γ1 corresponds to b in eq. (11), γ2 to c, and γ3 to d.
We estimate a probit model since we create a binary redistribution support indicator (described
below) which allows for easier presentation of results (in terms of the probability of supporting
redistribution). But note that both a more complex hierarchical ordered probit model as well as a
simpler linear probability model yield substantively identical results.
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Table 1: Distribution of redistribution preferences (in %), 1978-2010
7-point response scale
No
1

2

3

4

5

6

Yes
7

Support
Indicator

12.7

7.9

13

19.2

18.2

10.6

18.3

28.9

We also estimate the model in a Bayesian framework using nonparametric density
estimation for state- and time-specifc effects.
C. Dependent and independent variables
Preferences

We capture redistribution preferences using a commonly used measure

(e.g., Alesina and Angeletos 2005), available repeatedly in the GSS. It presents respondents with the following statement: “the government should reduce income
differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy
families or by giving income assistance to the poor”. Answers are recorded on a seven
point scale, with labeled endpoints “1=should” and “7=should not”, which we reverse
for ease of interpretation. Table 1 shows the distribution of responses in our sample.
It is immediately apparent that preferences regarding redistribution are polarized: a
relatively large number of responses are concentrated at both extremes of the scale.
As many as 18% of the individuals in a survey clearly declare the government should
reduce income differences, while as many as 13% vehemently declare that it should
not. For our statistical model we create an indicator variable which is equal to one
if a respondent indicates clear support of redistribution by choosing the highest or
second highest answer category (displayed in the last column of Table 1). While the
table provides a bird’s eye view of Americans’ redistribution preferences, we must
keep in mind that these are aggregate numbers (and do not refect the within-state
and time variation to be emphasized below).
Inequality

Our model conceptualizes inequality via the Atkinson index (see equation

8). We directly translate this into an empirical measure, by using state-level Atkinson
indexes for each year, denoted Q st (Atkinson 1970; Cowell 2000). The basis for our
calculations is tax return data from the Internal Revenue Service. This is preferable
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Figure 3: Map of inequality (Q st ) by state, 1978-2010.

to survey-based calculations, as argued in detail by Atkinson et al. (2011). Not
only are the very rich underrepresented in standard surveys but, in order to protect
respondents’ anonymity, incomes are usually top-coded. Consequently, the extent of
inequality tends to be underestimated when calculated from sample surveys. Matters
are improved when inequality is calculated from administrative records. We use the
Atkinson index from Frank (2009) who calculates a number of inequality measures
following Cowell and Mehta (1982) based on IRS data.
Figure 3 shows average levels of inequality by state over the period in our analysis.
The fgure shows inequality to be the highest in New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Florida, Texas and California. The most equal states are Nevada, Idaho, Indiana, West
Virginia, and Washington. Since the analysis to be developed below will emphasize
temporal within-state variation, Figure 4 shows the evolution of inequality in different
states (and regions) in the US from 1970 onward. The fgure illustrates a secular
increase in inequality from 1970 to 2010, but it also shows the degree of these
increases to be quite different in specifc states. In the Northeast, for example, the
levels of inequality across states are quite similar in 1970. By 2010, however, the
Atkinson index had increased only from 0.17 to around 0.25 in some states, while it
had experienced a much more explosive increase (from 0.17 to more than 0.35) in
others.
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Figure 4: Evolution of inequality, Q st , 1970-2010
Our choice of inequality measure follows directly from our theoretical model.15
Furthermore, the Atkinson index has a number of desirable properties (such as
subgroup decomposability; e.g., Shorrocks 1980). However, some researchers might
be more familiar or comfortable with the Gini index as a measure of inequality.
Therefore, we also provide results with inequality measured via the Gini coeffcient,
from the same source (Frank 2009), in our robustness section.
Income distance

We measure income distance as the distance between a respondent’s

household income and average national income in each year.16 The GSS captures

The sensitivity parameter ε of the estimated Atkinson index (which is general in our theoretical
model) is set to 0.5 in (Frank 2009).
16
This represents a simple centering, which leaves the distribution of incomes unchanged.
15
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income by asking respondents to place their total net household income into a number
of income bands. Following standard practice in the American Politics literature, we
transform income bands into midpoints (see e.g., Hout 2004). The top-coded income
category value is imputed by assuming that the upper tail of the income distribution
follows a Pareto distribution (e.g., Kopczuk et al. 2010). Finally, to allow meaningful
comparison over time, incomes are converted to constant dollars (with base year
2000).
Controls

To control for state-specifc changes in economic conditions, we use yearly

state-level unemployment rates. We calculate them by averaging the LA series from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics for state monthly unemployment rates (Bureau of Labor
Statistics 1992). As further individual-level controls we include a respondent’s age,
gender, education (years of schooling), an African-American indicator variable, and
a “non-white” summary indicator. Respondents’ labor market status is captured by
indicator variables for currently being self-employed, unemployed, or in part-time
employment. Finally we include an indicator for respondents living in urban areas.
Descriptive statistics for these variables are given in Table A.1 in the appendix.

V. RESULTS
Table 2 shows parameter estimates and standard errors for equation (13) under
various model specifcations.17 Columns (1) and (2) display results from our hierarchical model, without and with control variables, respectively. In both we fnd that
increasing income distance from the national mean is inversely related to support for
redistribution. The direct effect of inequality on preferences is considerably reduced
when we include a range of individual- and state-level control variables. In fact, there
is no statistically reliable main effect of inequality in specifcation (2). However, our
central argument (part D in proposition 1) is concerned with the income-conditional
effect of inequality, which is tested by our income-inequality interaction. Confrming
our expectations, we fnd a positive effect, indicating that inequality matters more for
the rich. The parameter estimate of this interaction is signifcant (in the statistical
sense; we evaluate its substantive importance below).

17

Appendix D shows an extended version of this table where we additionally include bootstrapped
standard errors. Our results are not affected by this choice.
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Table 2: Income, inequality and redistribution preferences. Estimates and
standard errors.
(1)
Income
Inequality
Income×inequality
Controls
Deviance
BIC
N

−0.126
(0.016)
1.402
(0.531)
0.209
(0.058)
no
22172
22409
19025

(2)

(3)

(4)

−0.105
(0.016)
0.696
(0.501)
0.208
(0.058)
yes

−0.106
(0.016)
0.994
(0.838)
0.210
(0.059)
yes

−0.189
(0.020)
2.195
(1.140)
0.379
(0.075)
yes

21718
22063
19025

21640
22448
19025

—
—
19025

Specifcations: (1), (2): Random effects, maximum likelihood estimates, (3) Fixed effects, maximum likelihood estimates, (4) Fixed effects, linear probability model.

Our empirical strategy exploits within-state changes in inequality. To make this
more explicit, we estimate a fxed-effects version of our model in specifcation (3).18
Our results are remarkably similar. They again emphasize the fact that the effect
of changing inequality is conditional on respondents’ income distance. Finally, in
specifcation (4) we employ a fxed-effects linear probability model, which uses all
seven categories of the dependent variable instead of our support indicator variable.
This specifcation, too, produces clear evidence for the conditional effect of inequality
on preferences.
A stricter statistical test for our theoretical argument is provided by computing
the marginal effect of a change in inequality conditional on income. Let M E(Q|Y, X )
denote the marginal effect of inequality, Q, conditional on income, Y , and controls
X . When calculating marginal effects, it is common to set control variables to their
sample mean, producing marginal effects for a hypothetical “typical” individual,

18

This is an unconditional fxed-effects model, since there is no way to integrate state-specifc constants
out of the likelihood. It is well known that unconditional (or dummy variable) fxed-effects
estimators for probit models are biased (Greene 2004) due to the incidental parameters problem
(Neyman and Scott 1948). However, since our number of cases per state is reasonably large, we
expect this not to be of major concern (see Katz 2001). In any case, we estimate a conditional
fxed-effects model in specifcation (4).
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Table 3: Marginal effects
(A) Marginal main effects
Income
Inequality

AM E(Y |X )
AM E(Q|X )

−0.017 (0.001)
0.196 (0.163)

(B) Marginal conditional inequality effect
Poor
Rich
Difference test

AM E(Q|Y = y P , X )
AM E(Q|Y = yR , X )

−0.027 (0.199)
0.489 (0.157)
p=0.002

Note: Average marginal effects, based on specifcation (2). Difference test is
distributed χ 2 with 1df. y P refers to the 10th percentile of the income distribution, yR refers to the 90th percentile.

M E(Q|Y = y, X = x̄). We opt for a clearer defnition based on counterfactuals.19
What we are interested in are effects of changes in inequality (conditional on income)
holding all else equal. Consequently, we calculate marginal effects for each case
changing only inequality and income and keeping all other variables at values observed
for that case: M Ei (Q|Y = y, X = x i ). Average marginal effects are then simple
Pn
averages over the marginal effects for each case, AM E(Q|Y, X ) = n−1 i=1 Mi .
Panel (A) of table 3 shows average marginal (unconditional) effects of inequality
and income distance on the likelihood to support redistribution. These direct effects
illustrate what we learned from Table 2. A marginal increase in income of all individuals leads to lower average support for redistribution, ceteris paribus. The main
effect of inequality is not statistically distinguishable from zero.
Panel (B) of table 3 shows average marginal effects of inequality conditional on
income. More precisely, we calculate the effect of a marginal change in inequality
among the rich (those at the 90th percentile of the income distribution, around 58,000
dollars above the mean in constant dollars) and the poor (those at the 10th, around
38,000 dollars below the mean in constant dollars). We argued that an upward shift in
inequality will mainly affect the rich, making them more supportive of redistribution.
We fnd that a marginal change in inequality has little effect on the redistribution
preferences of the poor, but has a marked and statistically signifcant effect for the rich.

19

Hanmer and Kalkan (2013) provide a detailed discussion of the advantages of this strategy. See also
Train (2009).
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Figure 5: Average predicted probability of redistribution support as function of income
distance in high and low inequality regions
As expected, we fnd that rising inequality increases support for redistribution among
the rich. Before we present the substantive magnitude of this effect using predicted
probabilities below, we calculate the difference in marginal effects between rich and
poor, i.e. AM E(Q|Y = yR , X ) − AM E(Q|Y = y P , X ). In other words, we test if the
differential effect of a marginal change for rich and poor is statistically signifcant.20
We calculate a χ 2 difference test, which shows that inequality does indeed affect the
rich differently in a (statistically) signifcant way.
To illustrate the substantive role of inequality in perhaps a more intuitive way,
Figure 5 shows the average predicted probability of redistribution support.21 In this
fgure, the only factors that change in the comparison of predicted probabilities are
income distance to the mean (on the x-axis) and the two levels of macro inequality
(the solid and dashed lines). High inequality refers to Atkinson index values at the

20

The fact that we fnd a signifcant effect in one group, and a non-signifcant effect in the other, does
not itself show that the difference is signifcant (cf. Gelman and Stern 2006).
21
Average predicted probabilities are calculated similar to the average marginal effects described
above. And they are, once again, based on specifcation (2) in Table 2.
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90th percentile of the state-level distribution (similar to that of Nevada and Florida in
2007), while low inequality refers to the 10th (as in Washington or Vermont in 1985).
The results provide a clear picture of the correspondence between our theoretical
argument (in Figure 2) and the empirical fndings. While the poor are similarly likely
to support redistribution in equal and unequal states, the rich are more likely to
support redistribution in states characterized by high levels of inequality.
An alternative way to illustrate the effects found in Table 2 is offered in Figure 6. In
this fgure, levels of macro inequality are now on the x-axis and the two distances to
the mean are now represented by the solid (the rich, 90th percentile) and dashed (the
poor, 10th percentile) lines. The predicted probabilities in this fgure re-emphasize
the main message in the paragraph above. For the poor, the level of macro inequality
does not make much of a difference (although, within the confdence bounds, it is
possible that their support for redistribution is slightly higher when macro inequality
is high). Their likelihood to support redistribution fuctuates around a level close to
0.35. For the rich, on the other hand, the probability of supporting redistribution
increases signifcantly as inequality grows from below 0.20 when inequality is at its
lowest, to almost 0.30 when it is at its highest.

VI. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
We conduct a number of robustness checks in order to investigate the sensitivity of
our results to alternative theoretical arguments. Below we summarize results from
12 specifcations. In each we estimate the full model, but only present parameter
estimates for γ3Q st yist , the income-inequality interaction, to save space.
Insurance

As discussed in section B, one prominent account of redistribution prefer-

ences is based on the idea of insurance motives. Forward-looking individuals possess
information about their risk of becoming unemployed and the likely costs of fnding a
new job. These costs are a function of the specifcity or non-transferability of their
skills. Individuals in occupations with higher risk of unemployment and/or more
specifc skills thus have an incentive to use the welfare state as a provider of insurance
(e.g., Iversen and Soskice 2001; Cusack et al. 2006). From this perspective, observing
individuals who prefer higher levels of redistribution does not necessarily represent
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Figure 6: Average predicted probability of redistribution support as function of inequality among rich and poor

altruism – they might simply insure their future selves against the vagaries of the
labor market.
We argue that insurance motives are compatible with our argument, which is not
about levels of redistribution preferences, but differences in preferences between high
and low inequality areas. We expect insurance factors to be orthogonal to our fndings
and capture insurance motives using two measures. Risk is captured by a variable
which estimates unemployment rates by occupations, following Rehm (2011). The
specifcity or non-transferability of skills is captured by an encompassing measure of
general and specifc skills proposed by Fleckenstein et al. (2011). When we add these
variables to our model in specifcations (1) and (2) in Table 4, we fnd that our core
result is indeed unchanged.
Urbanization & race

Although our analyses emphasize the state level, one may

argue that we ignore political geography, i.e., the distinct preferences of individuals
living in high-density urban areas (see, for example, Cho et al. 2006). As argued
by Rodden (2010: 322), individuals may sort themselves into neighborhoods with
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Table 4: Robustness checks. Parameter estimates
for income-inequality interaction
γ3Q st yist

Specifcation
Insurance
(1) Skill specifcity
(2) Occupational unempl.

0.209 (0.059)
0.174 (0.066)

Urbanization & Race
(3) Population density
(4) Nonwhite pop. share

0.207 (0.058)
0.208 (0.058)

Further checks
(5) Industry effects
(6) Gini (CPS)
(7) Social class
(8) Religion
(9) State crime rate
(10) State income
(11) Ideology
(12) Multiple imputation
(13) Nonparametric REa

0.208
0.182
0.203
0.209
0.202
0.208
0.181
0.180
0.171

(0.059)
(0.056)
(0.059)
(0.059)
(0.058)
(0.058)
(0.061)
(0.056)
(0.069)

Note: Sample size same as in main model, except for 18,849 in specifcations (4) and (6), 18,858 in (1) and (3), 16,501 in (5), and 17,969
in specifcation (13).
a: Estimates are posterior mean and standard deviation.

similar demographic, occupational, income, and ultimately political preferences. We
addressed this concern by including in our main specifcation an individual-level survey
variable which indicates if the respondent lives in an urban region (defned as cities
with at least 50,000 inhabitants). As an additional check we include in specifcation
(3) a state’s population density (calculated from Census population estimates). Again,
we fnd our results to be unchanged. Similarly, the racial heterogeneity of a state
(as opposed to a respondent’s race, which we include in our main model) might
negatively affect individual’s preferred levels of spending (see, for example, Luttmer
2001; Alesina and Glaeser 2004). We thus include a measure of racial heterogeneity
(the state-level share of non-white population, calculated from the Current Population
survey), we fnd our results to be robust in in Table 4’s specifcation (4).
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Further checks

Our results are also robust when accounting for sector specifc prefer-

ences by including a set of industry fxed effects in specifcation (5).22 Specifcation
(6) uses the Gini inequality measure calculated from the Current Population Survey
instead of IRS tax returns. Our main result is confrmed. For reasons of parsimony
we exclude a number of social factors such as religion and social class from our main
model. While clearly important, we argue that these factors are orthogonal to the
income-inequality nexus. Specifcations (7) and (8) in Table 4 show that including a
fve-category social class measure as well as religiosity (church attendance) in the
model leaves our results unchanged.23
An important regional feature that could drive our results is the level of crime (as a
potential concern by the rich, unconnected to altruism, for the negative externalities of
inequality). In specifcation (9) we use data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
Uniform Crime Reporting database on total regional crime rates and fnd our core
result unchanged. We also include state income per capita (calculated from the Current
Population Survey) to control for the fact that states differ in levels of average income.
Specifcation (10) shows that this does not impact our main fnding.
Our main model does not include ideology since we consider redistribution preferences to be conceptualized as a more specifc manifestation of ideology. Nonetheless,
in specifcation (11) in table 4 we show that our results hold even when including a
7-point ideology measure from the GSS.
On a more technical note, specifcation (12) is estimated using 5 multiply imputed
data sets (instead of list-wise deletion of missing cases), with multiple-imputation
adjusted standard errors, while specifcation (13) allows for a fexible nonparametric
random effects distribution via Dirichlet Process priors (for recent political science
applications see, e.g.,Kyung et al. 2011; Stegmueller 2013). The model is estimated
in a Bayesian framework, which also provides an additional robustness check for our
multilevel specifcation. In both specifcations, we fnd almost unchanged results.

22
23

We use the US Census Bureau’s industry classifcation at the 1-digit level.
We employ a fve category version of the Erikson-Goldthorpe class scheme: Service class I, Service
class II, Routine non-manual occupations, Skilled workers, and Unskilled workers. Those who are
self-employed are already included in our main model via an indicator variable.
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VII. CONCLUSION
It is perhaps most meaningful to conclude this paper by frst reminding the reader
about our main fndings and, more importantly, referring to the alternatives we fnd
no evidence for. Our results strongly support the existence of “income-dependent
altruism.” The rich in more unequal places do support redistribution more than
the rich in more equal places (while the poor’s support for redistribution is much
less affected by macro inequality). This paper’s analyses provide limited support
for alternative approaches to other-regarding preferences. Neither the “referencedependent inequity aversion” preferences proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
nor the “fairness” preferences in Alesina and Angeletos (2005) seem to apply to the
demand for redistribution in the US.
In the previous pages, we de-emphasized arguments about empathy and beliefs in
a just world, but our analyses also introduce a degree of doubt about their relevance.
In a signifcant contribution to the literature on redistribution, Lupu and Pontusson
(2011) propose that macro-levels of equality are related to empathy. They argue
that, because of social affnity, individuals will be inclined to have more similar
redistribution preferences to those who are closer to them in terms of income distance.
While Lupu and Pontusson emphasize skew (rather than Atkinson or Gini indices) and
the position of the middle class, their argument implies that social affnity would make
the rich have higher levels of support for redistribution as inequality decreases and
they become closer to the middle class and the poor (the opposite of the predictions
in this paper). A similar relationship would be expected by the approach that relates
beliefs in a just world to redistribution preferences. To the extent that macro-levels
of inequality are related to these beliefs (for example that inequality rewards the
hard-working and punishes the lazy), we would observe lower levels of support for
redistribution from the rich in states with higher inequality and a higher normative
tolerance for it (Benabou and Tirole 2006; Alesina and Glaeser 2004). Our evidence
fails to support these arguments.
Our research, fnally, runs counter to a set of fndings in the psychology literature
about the infuence of income on charitable giving and pro-social behavior. Using
surveys conducted in the US, some authors fnd that lower income individuals give
proportionally more to charitable causes than higher income ones (see for example,
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James and Sharpe 2007).24 These fndings, however, are contested by research
showing that the share of households giving to charity increases in income in both the
United States (Andreoni 2006) and Great Britain (Pharoah and Tanner 1997). Other
authors using experimental data fnd that subjective perceptions of one’s social class
rank in society promote generosity and charitable donations (see Piff et al. 2010).
This paper does not address the side of altruism that concerns voluntary donations.25
But our results do indicate that, irrespective of charity, the rich are more likely to
support government-based redistribution.
We will conclude by noting that, in some ways, this paper presents a somewhat
unintuitive result (the rich are more supportive of redistribution in those states where
inequality is highest). One might ask why we do fnd more inequality in precisely
the places where the rich are more supportive of redistribution. We think this is an
important question in need of a signifcant amount of further research. As McCarty
and Pontusson (2009) note, models of the political economy of redistribution involve
two separate propositions: there is a “demand” side, concerning the redistribution
preferences of voters, and a “supply” side, concerning the aggregation of these preferences and the provision of policy. In this paper we have focused on the frst proposition
and ignored the second. It is germane, however, to ask whether these redistribution
preferences have any political consequences. In a related paper “AUTHOR CITATION”
answer this question in the affrmative. They show that in the US, redistribution
preferences are a signifcant determinant of voting. More concretely, they demonstrate
that income distance matters to voting mainly through its effect on redistribution
preferences. Preferences alone explain half of the total effect of income on vote choice.
While more research on the supply side of redistribution is clearly needed (a number
of factors may intermediate between voting and the provision of redistributive policy),
the political relevance of this paper’s fndings should not be ignored.
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This research has found wide resonance in the popular press. See Greve (2009) or Johnston (2005).
The relationship between income and charity giving in OECD countries is a complicated one and not
always a good illustration of altruism, as the tax benefts of giving (often increasing with income)
are diffcult to assess.
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A. [ONLINE] APPENDIX
A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
We show that Ω = u [c̄(1 − Q)] = u(ce ), where
c̄(1 − Q)

(A.1)

is the “abbreviated social welfare function.” This equivalence, well-known in the
welfare economics literature, is reproduced here for the convenience of the reader.
For further discussion, see Atkinson (1970) and Lambert (1989: 109-136).
To begin, let ce = (1 − τ) ye + T be the level of disposable income that represents
the average utility given by the social welfare function, or
n

1
1X
u(c j ) = nu(ce ) = u(ce ).
n j=1
n

(A.2)

By Jensen’s Inequality, we know that ce ∈ (0, c̄) and therefore that ye ∈ (0, ȳ). In fact,
Atkinson (1970) characterizes this level of income as “equally distributed equivalent
income,” and it is the basic building block of the Atkinson Index. It represents the
level of income that if held by every individual would give that society the same level
of welfare as would obtain with any given allocation of unequally distributed incomes.
The Atkinson index is constructed as:
Q =1−

ce
.
c̄

(A.3)

Since ce is strictly below mean income, this expression is always positive and always
between 0 and 1. Indeed, as inequality increases, social welfare decreases as does ce .
This will be a useful property for subsequent proofs.
Next, using the specifc functional form for CRRA preferences in equation (6), we
can rewrite equation (A.2) as:
1−ε
n
1 X cj
=
1 − ε n j=1 1 − ε

ce1−ε
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(A.4)

Rearranging this equation in terms of ce , we obtain:

ce =

n

1 X 1−ε
c
n j=1 j

1/(1−ε)
(A.5)

Then, substituting this expression into the preliminary Atkinson Index in equation
(A.3), we obtain:
1
Q =1−
c̄



n

1 X 1−ε
c
n i=1 j

1/(1−ε)
,

(A.6)

which is equivalent to the expression given in equation (8).
Finally, to recover the social welfare function, substitute the Atkinson Index in
(A.6) into the abbreviated social welfare function (A.1) and then substitute the
result into the CRRA preferences in equation (6). The result is Ω. Hence, we have
Ω = u [c̄(1 − Q)] = u(ce ).

Proof of Proposition 1
First, we prove Part (A). The individual’s problem is to choose the tax rate that
maximizes her social utility function, given by equation (4):
max V = (1 − δ)u(ci ) + δu(ce )

τ∈[0,1]

(A.7)

subject to the government budget constraint in equation (2) and the individual’s own
budget constraint in equation (3). The frst-order condition for this problem gives the
preferred level of redistribution for each individual i, which we will term τ∗i :




(1 − δ)u0 (ci ) (1 − τ∗i ) ȳ − yi + δu0 (ce ) (1 − τ∗i ) ȳ − ye = 0

(A.8)

The second-order condition is given by:

∂ 2V
≡ σ(τ∗i , yi , ye ) = (1 − δ) u00 (ci ) [(1 − τ) ȳ − yi ]2 − u0 (ci ) ȳ
2
∂τ

+ δ u00 (ce ) [(1 − τ) ȳ − ye ]2 − u0 (ce ) ȳ < 0 (A.9)
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which is unambiguously negative.
Next, we show that τ∗i ∈ [0, 1). Rearrange the frst-order condition as:
τ∗i


 ε 

yi
ye
ci
δ
∗
= 1−
+
(1 − τi ) −
ȳ
1 − δ ce
ȳ


(A.10)

If δ = 0, that is, if individuals are not altruistic, then individual i’s optimal choice of
redistribution is τ∗i = 1− yi / ȳ, which is a familiar result for self-interested preferences.
In this case, preferences for redistribution are clearly decreasing in income, with τ∗i
going from 1 to 0 as income goes from 0 to ȳ. Compare this to altruistic individuals,
δ > 0. Setting τ = 0, equation (A.10) can be rewritten as:
δ
1−δ



yi
ye

ε

=−

( ȳ − yi )
( ȳ − ye )

(A.11)

Since the left-hand side is positive, this condition requires yi > ȳ. Defne the value
of yi that satisfes this equation as ŷ. Hence, ŷ > ȳ, as claimed. Notice also that
ŷ is potentially quite large, especially as inequality increases: ye → 0. Finally, the
maximum level of redistribution preferred by any individual is always less than one.
Setting τ = 1 in equation (A.10), we get
 
yi
δ
=−
1−δ
ye

(A.12)

which is never satisfed.
Further exploration of equation (A.10) provides some additional important insights.
First, let τ∗e be the level of redistribution that maximizes social welfare, Ω = u(ce ). The
value of τ∗e is such that the frst-order condition for maximizing social welfare equals
zero, which is (1 − τ∗e ) = ye / ȳ. Evaluated at τ∗e , the second expression on the righthand side of equation (A.10) becomes zero, so equation (A.10) becomes τ∗e = 1− yi / ¯y.
Clearly, the level of individual income that satisfes this expression is ye . Hence, an
individual with income yi = ye prefers the level of redistribution that maximizes social
welfare. Furthermore, along with Part (B) below, this also implies that for yi > ye , we
have τ∗i < τ∗e and thus (1 − τ∗i ) − ye / ȳ > 0. That is, for yi > ye , an individual prefers
a level of taxes and transfers such that the marginal beneft of reducing inequality
exceeds its cost. In other words, individuals with income above the equally distributed
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equivalent prefer less redistribution than social welfare demands, and hence social
welfare is positive and increasing at this level of redistribution. However, this also
means that for yi > ye , an individual prefers more redistribution than if she were
purely self-interested. To see this, evaluate equation (A.10) for a self-interested
individual (i.e., δ = 0) with income yi > ye . This implies that (1 − τ∗i ) − yi / ¯y = 0.
Compared to an altruistic individual (δ > 0), this makes the second term on the
right-hand side of (A.10) positive, because social welfare is increasing for τ∗i < τ∗e ,
which implies that τ∗i ( yi > ye , δ > 0) > τ∗i ( yi > ye , δ = 0). Because this is true, this
also implies that for an altruistic individual we have (1 − τ∗i ) − yi / ȳ < 0. That is,
the marginal beneft of redistribution to an individual’s material self-interest is lower
than its cost. In other words, relatively well-off individuals sacrifce some material
self- interest in order to satisfy their altruistic preferences for reducing inequality. An
analogous argument holds for yi < ye . However, these cases require choosing more
redistribution than social welfare requires, (1 − τ∗i ) − ye / ȳ < 0. Further, this means
that the second term on the right-hand side of equation (A.10) is now negative, which
implies that an individual with yi < ye prefers less redistribution than self-interest
demands: (1 − τ∗i ) − yi / ȳ > 0. To summarize, individuals with income below the
equally distributed equivalent ( yi < ye ) want less redistribution than they would if
they were purely self-interested, but more redistribution than is socially optimal. In
contrast, individuals with income above the equally distributed equivalent ( yi > ye ),
prefer more redistribution than if they were purely self-interested but less than is
socially optimal.
Second, we prove Part (B), that an individual i’s preferred level of redistribution τ∗i
is decreasing in individual income yi . Formally, we seek to demonstrate that

∂ τ∗i
∂ yi

< 0.

Totally differentiating the frst-order condition in equation (A.8), we obtain
dτ∗i
d yi

=−

(1 − δ) {u00 (ci ) [(1 − τ) ȳ − yi ] (1 − τ) − u0 (ci )}
σ(τ∗i , yi , ye )

(A.13)

Since the expression in the denominator is negative, the sign of the derivative depends on the sign of the numerator. For (1 − τ) ȳ ≥ yi , the numerator is clearly
negative. For (1 − τ) ȳ < yi , the numerator is negative if the following condition holds: u00 (ci ) [(1 − τ) ȳ − yi ] (1 − τ) − u0 (ci ) < 0. This condition reduces to
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(1 − ε) yi + ε(1 − τ) ȳ + T /(1 − τ) > 0, which is true for all ε ∈ (0, 1), all yi ∈ [0, ∞),
and all τ ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, we have

∂ τ∗i
∂ yi

< 0. This proves Part (B).

Third, we prove Part (C). Part (C) states that an individual i’s preferred level of
redistribution τ∗i is increasing in inequality Q. Formally, we demonstrate that

∂ τ∗i
∂Q

> 0.

From Lemma 1, we can express a change in inequality as an increase in Q: ye = Q 0 −Q.
Totally differentiating the frst-order condition in equation (A.8), we obtain
dτ∗i

δ {−u00 (ce ) [(1 − τ) ȳ − ye ] (1 − τ) + u0 (ce )}
=−
dQ
σ(τ∗i , yi , ye )

(A.14)

Once again, since the expression in the denominator is negative, the sign of the
derivative depends on the sign of the numerator. The numerator is clearly positive for
(1 − τ) ȳ ≥ ye . For (1 − τ) ȳ ≤ ye , the expression in the numerator is positive if the
following condition holds: −u00 (ce ) [(1 − τ) ȳ − ye ] (1 − τ) + u0 (ce ) > 0. This condition
reduces to (1 − ε) ye + ε(1 − τ) ȳ + T /(1 − τ) > 0, which is true for all ε ∈ (0, 1), all
ye ∈ [0, ȳ], and all τ ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, we have

∂ τ∗i
∂Q

> 0.

Fourth, we prove Part (D). Part (D) states that the effect of an increase in inequality
Q on an individual i’s preferred level of redistribution τ∗i is increasing in individual
income yi . Formally, this is equivalent to
and only if ε > 0, otherwise

∂ 2 τ∗i

∂ Q∂ yi

∂ 2 τ∗i
∂ Q∂ yi

≥ 0. Furthermore, this will be true if

= 0. We demonstrate this second claim frst. Using

the version of the frst-order condition in equation (A.10), set ε = 0. We can then
rewrite (A.10) as:
τ∗i





ye
yi
= (1 − δ) 1 −
+δ 1−
.
ȳ
ȳ

It is immediate from this that

∂ τ∗i
∂Q

∂ 2 τ∗i
δ
and
therefore
that
ȳ
∂ Q∂ yi
∂ 2 τ∗i
∂ Q∂ yi > 0. Establishing the

=

ε=
6 0 is a necessary condition for

(A.15)
= 0. This proves that
rest of the proof will

demonstrate suffciency.
We begin by showing that

∂ 2 τ∗i
∂ Q∂ yi

> 0 for all yi ∈ [0, ye ). By factoring out δce−ε from

the numerator and denominator, rewrite the expression for ∂ τ∗i /∂ Q from equation
(A.14) as:

dτ∗i
dQ

where
A=

=

A
MB + C

ε[(1 − τ) ȳ − ye ](1 − τ)
+1>0
ce
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(A.16)

1−δ
M=
δ


  ε
ce
>0
ci

B=

ε[(1 − τ) ȳ − yi ]2
+ ȳ > 0
ci

C=

ε[(1 − τ) ȳ − ye ]2
+ ȳ > 0
ce

and

We need to show that the following is true:
∂

2

τ∗i

∂ Q∂ yi

=

∂A
∂ yi (M B

+ C) − A



∂M
∂ yi B

+ M ∂∂ yBi + ∂∂ yCi

(M B + C)2


>0

(A.17)

Differentiating A with respect to yi , we obtain:


∗
ε[(1 − τ) ȳ − ye ] + ε(1 − τ) ȳ ε(1 − τ)[(1 − τ) ȳ − ye ]2 ∂ τi
∂A
=−
+
(A.18)
ce2
∂ yi
ce
∂ yi
For yi < ye , we have [(1 − τ) ȳ − ye ] < 0, which makes the frst term within the
parentheses ambiguous and the second term positive. However, since yi < ye makes
the frst term in A negative and [(1 − τ) ȳ − ye ] → 0 as yi → ye , the expression must
be positive (since −∂ τ∗i /∂ yi > 0). This implies

∂A
∂ yi (M B

+ C) > 0. Next, we have:


  ε
ce
∂M
1−δ
=ε
∂ yi
δ
c
 i


[(1 − τ∗i ) ȳ − ye ] [(1 − τ∗i ) ȳ − yi ] ∂ τ∗i (1 − τ∗i )
×
−
−
. (A.19)
ce
ci
∂ yi
ci
For yi < ye , we have [(1 − τ∗i ) ȳ − yi ] > 0 and [(1 − τ∗i ) ȳ − ye ] < 0. This makes
the parenthetical term within brackets positive. However, because the gross income
effect dominates the redistribution effect, the negative term, −(1 − τ∗i )/ci , dominates
the positive term within parentheses. This makes the whole expression negative and
therefore, −A ∂∂ Myi B > 0.
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Next, we have:
2ε[(1 − τ) ȳ − yi ] ε[(1 − τ) ȳ − yi ]2 (1 − τ)
∂B
=−
−
ci
ci
∂ yi


∗
2ε[(1 − τ) ȳ − yi ] ȳ ε[(1 − τ) ȳ − yi ]3 ∂ τi
−
+
ci
∂ yi
ci2

(A.20)

Once again, we have [(1−τ) ȳ − yi ] > 0, which makes the frst two terms negative, but
the second two terms positive, since −∂ τ∗i /∂ yi > 0. However, since in B [(1 − τ) ȳ −
yi ]2 > 0 and [(1 − τ) ȳ − yi ] → 0, the frst negative “income” effect must dominate
the second, positive “tax” effect. Therefore, −AM ∂∂ yBi > 0.
Finally, we have


∗
2ε[(1 − τ) ȳ − ye ] ȳ ε[(1 − τ) ȳ − ye ]3 ∂ τi
∂C
=−
+
ce2
∂ yi
ce
∂ yi

(A.21)

which, since [(1 − τ) ȳ − ye ] < 0 for yi < ye must be negative. Therefore, −A ∂∂ yCi > 0
and we conclude that equation (A.17) is positive.
Observe that for yi = ye , [(1 − τ) ȳ − ye ] = 0 and [(1 − τ) ȳ − yi ] = 0. Using this
fact, we get dτ∗i /dQ = δ/ ȳ. Hence at yi = ye ,
For yi ∈ ( ye , ŷ], it is easiest to show that
argument using the expression for ∂ τ∗i /∂ yi
∂ 2 τ∗
∂ 2 τ∗
∂ 2 τ∗
show that ∂ yi ∂ iQ > 0. Since ∂ yi ∂ iQ and ∂ Q∂ iyi

∂ 2 τ∗i
∂ Q∂ yi
∂ 2 τ∗i
∂ Q∂ yi

= 0.
> 0 by making an analogous

given in equation (A.13). In that case, we
are equivalent, this proves that

for all yi ∈ [0, ∞) and this concludes the proof.
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∂ 2 τ∗i
∂ Q∂ yi

≥0

B. Deriving the full estimating equation
From the frst order condition of individual i’s utility function in (4) we derive the
theoretical function τ∗i ( yi , Q), which represents i’s preferred level of redistribution, τ∗i ,
given i’s income, yi , and the level of inequality, Q. The second-order Taylor expansion
of τ∗i ( yi , Q) is given by:
τ∗i

∂ τ∗i

∂ τ∗i

∂ 2 τ∗i

2 ∗
2 ∗
1 ∂ τi 2 1 ∂ τi 2
=x+
yi +
Q+
Q yi +
y +
Q
∂ yi
∂Q
∂ Q∂ yi
2 ∂ yi2 i 2 ∂ Q2

(A.22)

Thus our full regression equation takes the form:
τ∗i = ax + b yi + cQ + dQ yi + 0.5e yi2 + 0.5 f Q2 .

(A.23)

Here, we measure τ∗i by R i , an individual’s continuous (categorical) stated preference for redistribution, just as we did in specifcation (4) in Table 2. Estimating
equation (A.23) using nonlinear least squares (using HC2 corrected ‘robust’ standard
errors) we confrm the result for our central prediction that

∂ 2 τ∗i
∂ Q∂ yi

> 0. Numerically,

the estimated marginal effect is 0.329 with a standard error of 0.077, while with the
‘reduced’ model used in the main text we obtained an estimate of 0.379, with s.e.
0.075.
C. Descriptive statistics
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics
Continuous variables
Income distance [10.000$]
Inequality (Gini)
Inequality (Atkinson)
Age [10 yrs]
Education [yrs]
State unemployment

Mean

SD

Min

Max

0.076
0.557
0.249
3.983
13.338
6.182

3.595
0.053
0.047
1.169
2.866
2.029

−5.687
0.439
0.164
2.000
0.000
2.300

12.542
0.697
0.405
6.500
20.000
17.400

Indicator variables
Female
Black
Other race
Part-time employed
Unemployed
Self-employed

%
54.0
13.5
5.4
11.9
6.4
11.4
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D. Bootstrap standard errors
Table A.2: Income, inequality and redistribution preferences. Estimates
with analytical standard errors in parentheses and cluster-bootstrap standard errors in brackets
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Controls

−0.126
(0.016)
[0.017]
1.402
(0.531)
[0.628]
0.209
(0.058)
[0.065]
no

−0.105
(0.016)
[0.017]
0.696
(0.501)
[0.589]
0.208
(0.058)
[0.063]
yes

−0.106
(0.016)
[0.016]
0.994
(0.838)
[0.842]
0.210
(0.059)
[0.060]
yes

−0.189
(0.020)
[0.022]
2.195
(1.140)
[1.091]
0.379
(0.075)
[0.084]
yes

Deviance
BIC
N

22172
22409
19025

21718
22063
19025

21640
22448
19025

—
—
19025

Income

Inequality

Income×inequality

Specifcations: (1), (2): Random effects, maximum likelihood estimates, (3) Fixed effects, maximum likelihood estimates, (4) Fixed effects, linear probability model. Bootstrap standard errors based on 200
re-samples within state panels.
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